News linked to both this project and an event.
Odaily Report: Derek Chiang, founder of ZeroDev and a developer involved with EIP-7702, posted on X stating that first, to be clear — EIP-7702 itself has no vulnerability. If you are using a wallet that supports EIP-7702 (MetaMask, Uniswap, Ambire, etc.), please do not panic.EIP-7702 is an Account Abstraction improvement proposal that allows externally owned accounts (EOAs) to sign a special message called a "7702 authorization," thereby embedding a smart contract into that account. This enables accounts to achieve powerful functionality, such as transaction batching — combining "authorization" and "transfer" into a single transaction, allowing you to complete a swap on Uniswap with just one click.Unfortunately, the same feature also allows hackers to efficiently transfer all your tokens in a single transaction. In the Binance hack incident, the hacker moved ETH, USDT, and 62 other tokens in one transaction, whereas without EIP-7702, they would have needed to send a separate transaction for each token. In this particular incident, many such transactions would have failed anyway, because Binance was still using the compromised wallet for withdrawals at the time, so all transactions sent by the hacker had to compete with legitimate transactions for Nonce (transaction sequence number). Therefore, using EIP-7702 did help the hacker steal funds as quickly and as extensively as possible.However, for the hacker to use EIP-7702, one of the following conditions must have been met: first, they obtained the private key; second, they tricked Binance into signing a 7702 authorization — the latter is highly unlikely, as it is hard to imagine Binance exposing an endpoint used for signing 7702 authorizations (or worse, signing raw messages that could be repackaged by the hacker for 7702 authorization). But until the official postmortem report is released, this possibility cannot be completely ruled out.Derek Chiang added: "As one of the contributors to account abstraction, I feel somewhat responsible for this hack incident, because while giving accounts more powerful functionality, we have indeed also given hackers stronger capabilities."
Odaily reports: Smart contract developer Justin Kalland posted on X that the Binance hacker appears to have made a potential mistake, and MetaMask should retain as much of any Web2 logs as they can obtain.Specifically, the hacker sent 175 million USDT to a new wallet, and about 2.5 minutes later, that wallet also received 2 ETH. This was likely used to pay for Gas fees, consistent with the pattern used by their other attack wallets.Exactly two minutes after that, the wallet used MetaMask's Gas Station service, even though it already had Gas fees at the time. Three consecutive transactions landed in the same block — an ETH top-up from Gas Station, an infinite USDT approval to the Kyber Network router, and a payment of 127.67 USDT to Gas Station. The amount of the ETH top-up exactly matched the combined maximum Gas budget of the Kyber approval and the USDT payment. Accurate down to wei (the smallest Ethereum unit).But the problem is that the ETH they had at the time was already fully sufficient to cover both fees, so a reasonable speculation is that they were using a MetaMask wallet at the time and, due to haste, mistakenly selected USDT to pay for Gas fees. For convenience, MetaMask sometimes defaults to this method, and the order of top-ups within the same block also matches how its implementation mechanism works.To use Gas Station in MetaMask, users must use MetaMask Sentinel. This means the transactions were broadcast through them, rather than through a regular RPC. This interaction likely left off-chain records at MetaMask, which may include IP metadata.Among all the attacker's wallets that have been checked, this is the only wallet showing use of Gas Station, and the wallet address is: 0xAa246BF639586a6Ba46762D378CE50cA4fc654a0.
According to Cointelegraph, Ethereum researcher Justin Drake warned that the rapid advancement of AI could accelerate mathematical attacks against the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), potentially breaking existing cryptographic systems within months under the worst-case scenario, and called on the industry to initiate "bunker mode"—transferring assets to new addresses with previously unexposed public keys to mitigate risk. Several industry insiders, however, expressed reservations. Coinbase Chief Cryptographer Yehuda Lindell stated there is currently "no evidence" that the mathematical assumptions underpinning ECDSA have been weakened; Trezor Bitcoin analyst Lucien Bourdon similarly noted that migrating assets could backfire and inadvertently create opportunities for scams. MetaMask founder Taylor Monahan was even more direct, asserting that if elliptic curve cryptography were truly compromised, "the entire world would go to zero," rendering bunker mode ineffective. Meanwhile, Ethereum has laid out a post-quantum roadmap based on hash-based signatures and ZK proofs, while public blockchains such as Solana and NEAR are also exploring their own quantum-safe alternatives, though concrete deployment timelines remain unset.
Revoke.cash issued a reminder stating that, following last week's Magic Eden security incident, Ultimate subscribers must ensure their wallets meet two conditions for the Auto-Revoking feature to properly protect assets: first, granting Auto-Revoking permissions for the wallet in MetaMask; second, the wallet has been upgraded to a MetaMask Smart Account on the corresponding network. The second step is normally completed automatically during the authorization process, but if the address had already been upgraded to a Smart Account via another wallet application, the upgrade may fail.
Consensys founder Joseph Lubin stated in a post that the team has recently addressed and resolved a security incident impacting some infrastructure. Based on current investigation results, there is no indication that the MetaMask wallet or user funds within it were affected. The mnemonic phrase, private keys, and wallet assets were not compromised in this incident, and users retain full control over their assets.
MetaMask announced it is exiting the affected validator nodes in its non-custodial staking service, and there are currently no signs that wallets or customer funds have been compromised.
Aave founder Stani stated on X that the team is tracking the developments of the MetaMask staking infrastructure security incident in collaboration with Lido. Stani noted that so far, the Aave market has not been affected by the incident, and all operations remain fully operational.
MetaMask stated that some infrastructure was affected by a security incident, but no direct threat to MetaMask wallets has been identified to date, and it has voluntarily exited the affected validator nodes.
blockchain security researcher Specter has stated that while investigating the Payy Network attack incident, he discovered that an address associated with a MetaMask Swap router contract was blacklisted by Tether in 2021 and has remained blacklisted ever since. Specter said he had not previously noticed this situation.
that, according to DeFi researcher @Zun2025 posted on X platform, "MetaMask hired a DPRK-linked hacker as a developer without even conducting a proper background check that could have revealed his identity.The hacker's GitHub username is imyugioh, and he has been publicly listed on the Lazarus Group website since September 2025, yet MetaMask still hired this individual in March 2026. Source: lazarus.group/team/mauro-liu. Imagine that one of the largest wallets granted core code repository access to someone already on a publicly known list of DPRK hackers. Now think about what might happen to those small protocols with absolutely no security teams."Earlier reports stated that a North Korean hacker, Tyler Knapp, infiltrated the MetaMask team. He entered MetaMask through a long-term cooperating human resources supplier via an outsourcing arrangement, bypassing the background checks of the company's direct recruitment process. He worked at the company for a month and participated in the development of the wallet's fiat on/off ramp functionality. During this period, his IP address and behavioral anomalies were detected by the company's security monitoring. The company immediately revoked all his access permissions and suspended the release of all products he had worked on. No substantial data or financial losses have been caused so far.