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Project Overview
Merkle is a Remote Procedure Call (RPC) to implement MEV-Share, a groundbreaking architecture that gives MEV refunds to users.
Bitcoin Developers Propose BIP-361 to Counter Future Potential Quantum Attack Risks
Odaily News Bitcoin contributor Jameson Loop and other cryptographers have proposed an initiative that could force Bitcoin holders to migrate their tokens to new quantum-resistant addresses, otherwise their tokens would be permanently frozen by the network itself. In this scenario, holders would technically still "own" the coins but would lose the ability to transfer them. This is known as Bitcoin Improvement Proposal BIP-361, which was updated in Bitcoin's official proposal repository on Tuesday under the title "Post-Quantum Migration and Legacy Signature Deprecation".BIP-361 builds upon the BIP-360 proposal introduced in February. BIP-360 introduced a soft fork (a network upgrade) designed to enable a new transaction type called "Pay-to-Merkle-Root" (P2MR). This method draws from Bitcoin's Taproot (P2TR) framework but removes the key-based spending path, thereby eliminating an element widely considered to be at risk in the quantum era.The BIP-361 proposal divides the migration into three phases. Phase A begins three years after activation, prohibiting anyone from sending new Bitcoin to legacy, quantum-vulnerable addresses. You can still spend from these addresses but cannot receive any coins.Phase B begins five years after activation, rendering legacy signatures (ECDSA and Schnorr) completely invalid. The network will reject any attempts to spend coins from quantum-vulnerable wallets. Essentially, your coins will be frozen.Finally, there is Phase C, a still-under-research rescue plan: holders of frozen wallets may be able to prove ownership via zero-knowledge proofs (a method of proving knowledge of a secret without revealing the secret itself). If successful, coins frozen in Phase B could be recovered. (CoinDesk)
Hyperbridge Contract Hit by MMR Proof Replay Vulnerability, Suffering ~$242,000 in Losses
According to BlockSec Phalcon, the HandlerV1 contract managed by Hyperbridge on the Ethereum network was found to contain a Merkle Mountain Range (MMR) proof replay vulnerability, resulting in approximately $242,000 in losses. The vulnerability stems from the lack of binding between proofs and requests, enabling attackers to replay historical valid proofs alongside newly forged requests to perform malicious actions—such as altering administrator privileges. In the specific incident, the attacker changed the Polkadot (DOT) token administrator and then exploited those privileges to mint additional DOT tokens for profit. Observed attack transactions include: changing the DOT token administrator and minting new tokens (losses of ~$237,400), changing the ARGN token administrator and minting new tokens (losses of ~$3,800), and host withdrawal operations. The vulnerability was discovered by PhalconSecurity and analyzed via PhalconExplorer. Previously, the Hyperbridge gateway contract was attacked, leading to the unauthorized minting and subsequent dumping of 1 billion DOT tokens on Ethereum.
Related news
Vitalik: EIP-8141 Transaction Type to Prepare Ethereum for Decentralized Hyper-Scale Expansion in the Coming Years
Odaily News: Vitalik posted on X platform, stating that recent research around transaction formats has given Ethereum a clearer understanding of "actions" and "dependencies" within transactions, allowing the two to be optimized separately. Signatures, Merkle proofs for UTXOs, and ZK-SNARKs or STARKs fall under dependencies, while calls to send ETH are actions. Dependencies can be processed in parallel; state-related dependencies can be handled by the mempool, while pure dependencies can be processed once at the mempool layer and may potentially be replaced by STARK proofs, reducing execution and data processing overhead. Vitalik pointed out that Ethereum's current scaling strategy requires a clear distinction between dynamically flexible and statically analyzable parts, with the latter qualifying for lower gas costs. By transaction volume, over 90% of Ethereum activity does not require dynamic flexibility. The EIP-8141 transaction type is moving towards a general, minimal call-list direction, with new state types, recursive STARK mempools, and keyed nonces also aligning with this direction.
Deribit 拟于 9 月 1 日下线公开储备证明页面
据 Cryptoslate 报道，Deribit 将于 9月 1 日移除其公开的“储备证明”（Proof of Reserves）页面，此前，用户可通过该系统验证自身余额是否被纳入快照，并将平台汇总负债与公开钱包持仓进行比对。 据悉，此次调整发生在 Deribit与 Coinbase 完成整合之后，目前其约 90%的客户资产已纳入 Coinbase 托管安排。需要注意的是，Deribit 现有储备证明系统采用隐私保护型二叉 Merkle 树和每日资产快照，公开储备证明本身并未覆盖其全部托管资产。Deribit 尚未承诺 9月 1 日之后提供新的公开储备证明仪表盘，也未确认会继续提供客户级 Merkle 验证。
Neynar Announces Search for New Owner for Farcaster; Protocol Revenue Plummets 99% Just Seven Months After Acquisition
According to The Defiant, Rish Mukherji, co-founder of Neynar, the current operator of decentralized social protocol Farcaster, announced on August 17 that the company has initiated a process to seek a new team to take over Farcaster, token launchpad Clanker, and its own developer platform, and Neynar staff will be laid off accordingly. This marks the second change of ownership for Farcaster within 2026. In January of this year, the original founding team Merkle Manufactory transferred the protocol contracts, codebase, Farcaster App, and Clanker entirely to Neynar, and original founders Dan Romero and Varun Srinivasan subsequently joined Tempo, a payment public chain incubated by Stripe and Paradigm. The sharp deterioration of Farcaster's economic data is the core reason for this sale. According to DefiLlama data, protocol fees fell from $35.43 million in Q1 2026 to $4.67 million in Q2, recorded only $376,700 in the third quarter as of August 17, and revenue in the past 30 days shrank further to $120,000. Meanwhile, CLANKER token buybacks supported by protocol revenue have completely stopped, with CLANKER currently trading at 12
Bitcoin Developers Propose BIP-361 to Counter Future Potential Quantum Attack Risks
Odaily News Bitcoin contributor Jameson Loop and other cryptographers have proposed an initiative that could force Bitcoin holders to migrate their tokens to new quantum-resistant addresses, otherwise their tokens would be permanently frozen by the network itself. In this scenario, holders would technically still "own" the coins but would lose the ability to transfer them. This is known as Bitcoin Improvement Proposal BIP-361, which was updated in Bitcoin's official proposal repository on Tuesday under the title "Post-Quantum Migration and Legacy Signature Deprecation".BIP-361 builds upon the BIP-360 proposal introduced in February. BIP-360 introduced a soft fork (a network upgrade) designed to enable a new transaction type called "Pay-to-Merkle-Root" (P2MR). This method draws from Bitcoin's Taproot (P2TR) framework but removes the key-based spending path, thereby eliminating an element widely considered to be at risk in the quantum era.The BIP-361 proposal divides the migration into three phases. Phase A begins three years after activation, prohibiting anyone from sending new Bitcoin to legacy, quantum-vulnerable addresses. You can still spend from these addresses but cannot receive any coins.Phase B begins five years after activation, rendering legacy signatures (ECDSA and Schnorr) completely invalid. The network will reject any attempts to spend coins from quantum-vulnerable wallets. Essentially, your coins will be frozen.Finally, there is Phase C, a still-under-research rescue plan: holders of frozen wallets may be able to prove ownership via zero-knowledge proofs (a method of proving knowledge of a secret without revealing the secret itself). If successful, coins frozen in Phase B could be recovered. (CoinDesk)
Hyperbridge Contract Hit by MMR Proof Replay Vulnerability, Suffering ~$242,000 in Losses
According to BlockSec Phalcon, the HandlerV1 contract managed by Hyperbridge on the Ethereum network was found to contain a Merkle Mountain Range (MMR) proof replay vulnerability, resulting in approximately $242,000 in losses. The vulnerability stems from the lack of binding between proofs and requests, enabling attackers to replay historical valid proofs alongside newly forged requests to perform malicious actions—such as altering administrator privileges. In the specific incident, the attacker changed the Polkadot (DOT) token administrator and then exploited those privileges to mint additional DOT tokens for profit. Observed attack transactions include: changing the DOT token administrator and minting new tokens (losses of ~$237,400), changing the ARGN token administrator and minting new tokens (losses of ~$3,800), and host withdrawal operations. The vulnerability was discovered by PhalconSecurity and analyzed via PhalconExplorer. Previously, the Hyperbridge gateway contract was attacked, leading to the unauthorized minting and subsequent dumping of 1 billion DOT tokens on Ethereum.