News linked to both this project and an event.
Aave officially stated that the precautionary freeze measures taken following the Binance security incident have now been lifted, and all markets on Aave V3 and V4 have returned to normal. Previously, after receiving initial information about the incident, Aave paused new deposits and borrowings, but users could still withdraw assets and repay loans normally. Aave emphasized that its smart contracts were not affected by the incident, and user positions remained fully collateralized at all times. As an ongoing precautionary measure, the LTV of USDT, USDC, USDT0, POL, WAVAX, sAVAX, XAUT, PAXG, and OP will temporarily remain at 0, and these assets cannot be used as collateral for new borrowings.
According to monitoring by Bubblemaps, the hack of a third-party service provider for Polymarket has resulted in the theft of assets belonging to over 700 users, totaling approximately $3.46 million. Of this amount, roughly $2.7 million has been converted to POL and transferred out, while approximately $0.75 million remains in Polymarket.
According to Decrypt, Polymarket has switched trading to cancel-only mode and paused relay operations due to a security incident, with multiple users reporting unauthorized asset transfers. The suspected attacker's address holds approximately $2.65 million in POL.
Polygon Labs has announced the official release of Bor v2.10.3, which fixes two medium-severity denial-of-service vulnerabilities in BlockSTM V2 parallel block execution. Both issues were reported through the Immunefi bug bounty program.In addition, the new version includes multiple security and stability improvements, such as transaction filtering, RPC execution concurrency limits, and pending transaction cleanup. The team stated that the affected versions are Bor v2.10.1 and v2.10.2, where BlockSTM V2 is enabled by default, and that no exploitation of these vulnerabilities has been detected on the mainnet or the Amoy testnet. This upgrade does not involve a hard fork, and nodes can upgrade gradually as needed.
According to on-chain investigator vxdb, the Gamdom platform was targeted in a security attack. Preliminary data indicates that attackers stole approximately $2.2 million worth of assets across EVM-compatible chains, including Ethereum, BSC, Polygon, Arbitrum, and Optimism. Additionally, the Solana network suffered losses of around $965,000, while the TRON and Bitcoin networks each lost approximately $375,000 and $668,000, respectively. The total value stolen across all chains now exceeds $4.2 million.
Odaily report: According to RevokeCash monitoring, if users have previously traded NFTs on the Magic Eden Ethereum marketplace, their wallets may have granted approval to Limit Break's Payment Processor contract; this contract currently has a known vulnerability, and it is recommended to revoke the approval. Magic Eden previously stated that NFTs currently still listed on its platform are not affected by this vulnerability; NFTs listed through its EVM marketplace between approximately February 2024 and October 2024 may be affected, while listings after October 2024 are in principle not affected. Magic Eden is contacting protocol owner and maintainer Limit Break to study other risk mitigation measures, including pausing protocol transfers, and continues to investigate the actual scope of impact.Users who have previously listed or traded NFTs on the Magic Eden EVM marketplace should revoke the relevant contract approvals on Ethereum, Polygon, and Base networks, and revoke all NFT approvals marked as "approved for all." Yuga Labs Blockchain Vice President Quit stated that the asset claim website for the Payment Processor vulnerability NFT theft incident has officially launched; affected users whose NFTs were successfully safeguarded can now claim, but must first revoke their approval to the Payment Processor.
Magic Eden clarified on the X platform that Payment Processor V2, an NFT trading protocol under Limit Break, was recently exploited. Magic Eden stopped using this protocol in October 2024 and will completely shut down its EVM marketplace in Q1 2026, so this exploit did not affect existing Magic Eden listings. However, NFTs listed on the Magic Eden EVM marketplace from February to October 2024 may have been impacted, and users should revoke the "Approve for All" authorization for the contract on Ethereum, Polygon, and Base. Additionally, Magic Eden stated it is collaborating with Limit Break to investigate and seek further mitigation measures.
According to Cointelegraph, Polygon disclosed several previously undisclosed security vulnerabilities affecting its Bor and Heimdall clients, which could lead to denial of service (DoS), validator resource exhaustion, and anomalies in checkpoint and milestone processing. The relevant vulnerabilities have currently been patched through two hard forks: Austin and Kyoto.
Polygon disclosed multiple hidden security vulnerabilities affecting its PoS network and implemented preventive fixes through a recent fork, with no evidence of actual exploitation.
Odaily News – SlowMist security team has disclosed the discovery of a GitHub repository impersonating the Qwen 3.8 27B local quantized model. The repository claims the model size exceeds 16 GB, but the actual downloaded content is only about 487 KB, containing disguised files, a LuaJIT interpreter, and obfuscated Lua scripts. SlowMist emphasized that the official Qwen project has not been compromised. According to SlowMist's analysis, once executed, the malicious program collects host data, captures screenshots, and sends them to the attacker's C2 server. When the hardcoded server becomes inactive, it reads a backup C2 address from a contract on the Polygon chain, allowing attackers to rotate infrastructure through on-chain transactions. Subsequent payloads can steal browser login credentials, cookies, browsing history, email accounts, WinSCP and Steam credentials, as well as wallet-related files and extension data. SlowMist also discovered at least 23 GitHub repositories and 29 similar archive files using the same Lua delivery chain.
blockchain gaming platform The Sandbox has announced it will compensate users who held bridged SAND on Base or BNB Smart Chain prior to the August 21 bridge vulnerability exploit at a 1:1 ratio. The compensation will be paid using Ethereum-based SAND from the project treasury, with no new tokens being minted.The attack resulted in approximately 14.744 million SAND being stolen from the Ethereum treasury, valued at around $700,000. The claims process is expected to open within two weeks and will last for two weeks; two centralized exchanges holding over 72% of eligible balances will directly distribute compensation to affected customers.The Sandbox stated that the attacker exploited a configuration vulnerability in SAND contracts on Base and BNB Chain, becoming the sole validator of bridge messages and minting unbacked tokens. Additionally, over 339 trillion unbacked SAND tokens were minted across the two networks, but these have been quarantined and cannot be bridged or exchanged. SAND on Ethereum and Polygon was unaffected, and the compromised bridge contracts will be permanently decommissioned. (Cointelegraph)
Odaily News, The Sandbox has released a post-mortem report on the August 22 vulnerability incident. The report shows that attackers exploited vulnerabilities in contracts related to cross-chain configurations on Base and BNB Smart Chain (BSC), stealing 14,742,341.84 SAND from the Ethereum treasury, accounting for approximately 0.5% of the maximum supply, with an estimated economic impact of approximately $1.4968 million, of which about $987,000 was actually retained by the attackers. The Ethereum mainnet and Polygon network were not affected. Until further notice, please do not purchase or send SAND on Base or BNB Smart Chain. Contracts deployed on Base and BNB Smart Chain have been permanently deactivated and will not be reopened. The Sandbox stated that the team has reported the attacker's wallet address to blockchain analysis firms TRM Labs and Chainalysis, and has communicated directly with relevant exchanges. The Sandbox also announced a compensation plan, which will compensate wallets that legitimately held cross-chain SAND on Base or BSC prior to the incident at a 1:1 ratio in Ethereum SAND. Compensation funds will come from The Sandbox treasury, with no new tokens issued. The claim process will open within the next two weeks and remain open for two weeks.
Odaily News, SlowMist Security Team disclosed that the cross-chain bridge project Allbridge suffered an attack on August 19, 2026, with losses of approximately $190,000. Notably, this attack was not executed instantaneously—the attacker began laying the groundwork nearly a month in advance, bypassing the verification mechanism through forged cross-chain messages.According to SlowMist's analysis, on July 26, the attacker directly called Circle's MessageTransmitterV2.sendMessage function on the Polygon chain, constructing a cross-chain message disguised as CCTP-style, claiming a transfer of 1 million USDC, despite no actual USDC burn operation occurring. Subsequently, Circle generated a valid attestation for this complete message following standard procedures.Approximately 24 days later, on August 19, the attacker waited for the Base Router to receive a genuine CCTP deposit, bringing its balance to approximately 191,000 USDC, then launched the attack just 6 seconds later. Using the previously forged message and attestation, the attacker called Allbridge's receiveCctpMessage function. Due to the project's lack of critical validation, the system mistook the fraudulent cross-chain message for a genuine deposit and recorded a 1 million USDC credit.Subsequently, the attacker borrowed approximately 809,000 USDC temporarily via an Aave flash loan to match the Router's balance with the forged amount, then utilized the internal credit record to call the transfer function, ultimately moving out approximately 999,000 USDC (after deducting a 0.1% fee). After repaying the flash loan and fees, the attacker netted approximately $189,800 in profit. The root cause of this vulnerability lies in Allbridge's failure to verify the identity of the cross-chain message sender and receiver, as well as its failure to confirm whether USDC was genuinely minted or whether the balance actually increased—instead directly trusting the amount and message hash data constructed by the attacker.SlowMist emphasized that on-chain message verification does not equate to actual asset arrival. Cross-chain protocols must not only verify message authenticity but also ensure the message source is trustworthy, confirm the receiver is Circle's official TokenMessengerV2, and only record assets after confirming actual minting and balance changes. This incident once again highlights the security risks in cross-chain bridges' message verification and asset settlement processes.
Odaily News: Metaverse gaming platform The Sandbox has confirmed a vulnerability in its cross-chain bridge, allowing attackers to mint unbacked SAND on Base and BNB Smart Chain. Blockchain security firm PeckShield detected on August 21 that two addresses had collectively minted approximately 14.9 billion SAND. The Sandbox subsequently shut down bridging functionality on both networks.The Sandbox stated that the affected assets are bridged assets on Base and BNB Smart Chain, while SAND on Ethereum and Polygon, user wallet assets, and the Ethereum-locked assets backing the token remain unaffected. The proportion of genuinely collateralized assets involved in this incident is less than 0.01% of the total SAND supply.The Sandbox is developing a compensation plan for affected liquidity providers and advises users not to trade SAND on Base or BNB Smart Chain until bridging is restored. Coinbase plans to delist 10 perpetual futures contracts, including SAND, on August 26, with open positions to be automatically settled at that time. (Bitcoin.com News)
The Sandbox has officially confirmed and fully secured the recent SAND cross-chain bridge vulnerability affecting the Base and BNB Smart Chain (BSC) networks. Attackers exploited the flaw to mint uncollateralized SAND tokens across both networks, but the impact remains limited, accounting for less than 0.01% of the total SAND supply. SAND on Ethereum and Polygon, along with user wallets, remain unaffected. The Sandbox has since disabled cross-chain functionality on both networks. SAND on Base and BSC has been isolated and is temporarily non-transferable and non-redeemable. The official team advises users to avoid buying, selling, or trading SAND on the aforementioned networks.
DeFi infrastructure company Enso disclosed a type of malicious liquidity pool called "toxic pools" in a report on July 16th. These pools manipulate transaction simulations to return false optimal quotes to wallets and DEX aggregators, subsequently altering the logic during actual on-chain execution. Enso stated that the relevant malicious contracts can identify read-only simulation environments and return optimized prices, but when the transaction is broadcast on-chain, it is executed at a worse price or causes the transaction to fail. One manipulated Curve pool processed over 129,000 swaps, resulting in approximately $225,000 in inflated quotes. Additionally, over 37,000 transactions were reverted, consuming nearly $30,000 in gas fees. On Polygon, a malicious Uniswap v4 hook attracted routing systems with fake exchange rates, subsequently triggering a 99.1% transaction failure rate. Enso stated that it has updated its execution protection product, Enso Shield, to detect fake quotes in Ethereum and Polygon environments.
Polymarket staff member Shantikiran Chanal posted on platform X, stating that they have taken note of the security reports related to reward distribution, and that user funds and market settlements remain safe. The investigation indicates that a private key leak occurred in a wallet used for internal operations, and the issue is not related to contracts or core infrastructure. Further updates will be provided.Previous report: ZachXBT stated that the Polymarket UMA CTF Adapter contract allegedly came under attack on Polygon, with over $520,000 having been drained.
According to on-chain investigator ZachXBT, Polymarket’s UMA CTF adapter on the Polygon network appears to have been attacked, resulting in losses exceeding $520,000 so far.
THORChain has released its fourth update regarding the Asgard vault intrusion incident, publishing the ADR028 proposal and opening voting for node operators. The proposal indicates that the protocol will first absorb losses through its Protocol-Owned Liquidity (POL), with the remaining portion to be borne by synthetic asset holders. The exact proportion is still under evaluation. The POL will be reduced to zero as a result, and the proposal suggests allocating a portion of system revenue over time to gradually replenish it. This plan does not involve minting new RUNE, selling RUNE, or diluting holder equity.On the technical side, the GG20 version will be temporarily retained with a patch upgrade. Trading will resume after the vulnerability is fixed and a successful node rotation is completed. A slower, more security-focused release cadence is planned for the future.Regarding the slashing mechanism, unrelated nodes sharing the same vault as the attacker will be protected, while the attacker's node will be fully slashed. The recovered RUNE will be paired with recoverable assets from the affected vault, and any excess RUNE will be burned.Additionally, THORChain has offered a white-hat bounty to the attacker to recover funds. If a portion of the funds is recovered, the recovery plan will be adjusted proportionally. THORChain emphasizes its commitment to remaining neutral and permissionless, stating it will not censor the attacker's swap transactions after trading resumes.Currently, node operators are voting on the overall direction and principles of the proposal. The specific figures in the ADR are indicative and will be adjusted later via the Mimir mechanism. The goal is to restart the network as soon as possible. A "yes" vote means developers can proceed further along this path.
Odaily Odaily, THORChain posted on platform X that its developers have released an incident update on Discord. Current evidence points to a node thor16uc...cn84q, which recently joined the network, as being associated with the attack. This node is operated by a single malicious actor. The primary hypothesis is that the attacker exploited a vulnerability in the GG20 TSS implementation, causing sensitive key material of vault participants to leak over time. This ultimately enabled the reconstruction of the vault's private key and the execution of unauthorized outgoing transactions.Regarding network status, the network has been paused after multiple node operators executed `make pause`. RUNE transfers and on-chain observation may resume within approximately 12 hours, but transactions, LP operations, signing, and other sensitive operations remain paused.Discussed recovery plans include slashing the affected node's bond, covering losses with protocol-owned liquidity (POL), or other community-driven solutions. THORSec and Outrider Analytics are continuing their investigation. The Treasury is gathering forensic data and coordinating with relevant law enforcement agencies. Full functional recovery is expected to take several days or longer.