News linked to both this project and an event.
According to Cointelegraph, Polygon disclosed several previously undisclosed security vulnerabilities affecting its Bor and Heimdall clients, which could lead to denial of service (DoS), validator resource exhaustion, and anomalies in checkpoint and milestone processing. The relevant vulnerabilities have currently been patched through two hard forks: Austin and Kyoto.
Polygon disclosed multiple hidden security vulnerabilities affecting its PoS network and implemented preventive fixes through a recent fork, with no evidence of actual exploitation.
Odaily News – SlowMist security team has disclosed the discovery of a GitHub repository impersonating the Qwen 3.8 27B local quantized model. The repository claims the model size exceeds 16 GB, but the actual downloaded content is only about 487 KB, containing disguised files, a LuaJIT interpreter, and obfuscated Lua scripts. SlowMist emphasized that the official Qwen project has not been compromised. According to SlowMist's analysis, once executed, the malicious program collects host data, captures screenshots, and sends them to the attacker's C2 server. When the hardcoded server becomes inactive, it reads a backup C2 address from a contract on the Polygon chain, allowing attackers to rotate infrastructure through on-chain transactions. Subsequent payloads can steal browser login credentials, cookies, browsing history, email accounts, WinSCP and Steam credentials, as well as wallet-related files and extension data. SlowMist also discovered at least 23 GitHub repositories and 29 similar archive files using the same Lua delivery chain.
blockchain gaming platform The Sandbox has announced it will compensate users who held bridged SAND on Base or BNB Smart Chain prior to the August 21 bridge vulnerability exploit at a 1:1 ratio. The compensation will be paid using Ethereum-based SAND from the project treasury, with no new tokens being minted.The attack resulted in approximately 14.744 million SAND being stolen from the Ethereum treasury, valued at around $700,000. The claims process is expected to open within two weeks and will last for two weeks; two centralized exchanges holding over 72% of eligible balances will directly distribute compensation to affected customers.The Sandbox stated that the attacker exploited a configuration vulnerability in SAND contracts on Base and BNB Chain, becoming the sole validator of bridge messages and minting unbacked tokens. Additionally, over 339 trillion unbacked SAND tokens were minted across the two networks, but these have been quarantined and cannot be bridged or exchanged. SAND on Ethereum and Polygon was unaffected, and the compromised bridge contracts will be permanently decommissioned. (Cointelegraph)
Odaily News, The Sandbox has released a post-mortem report on the August 22 vulnerability incident. The report shows that attackers exploited vulnerabilities in contracts related to cross-chain configurations on Base and BNB Smart Chain (BSC), stealing 14,742,341.84 SAND from the Ethereum treasury, accounting for approximately 0.5% of the maximum supply, with an estimated economic impact of approximately $1.4968 million, of which about $987,000 was actually retained by the attackers. The Ethereum mainnet and Polygon network were not affected. Until further notice, please do not purchase or send SAND on Base or BNB Smart Chain. Contracts deployed on Base and BNB Smart Chain have been permanently deactivated and will not be reopened. The Sandbox stated that the team has reported the attacker's wallet address to blockchain analysis firms TRM Labs and Chainalysis, and has communicated directly with relevant exchanges. The Sandbox also announced a compensation plan, which will compensate wallets that legitimately held cross-chain SAND on Base or BSC prior to the incident at a 1:1 ratio in Ethereum SAND. Compensation funds will come from The Sandbox treasury, with no new tokens issued. The claim process will open within the next two weeks and remain open for two weeks.
Odaily News, SlowMist Security Team disclosed that the cross-chain bridge project Allbridge suffered an attack on August 19, 2026, with losses of approximately $190,000. Notably, this attack was not executed instantaneously—the attacker began laying the groundwork nearly a month in advance, bypassing the verification mechanism through forged cross-chain messages.According to SlowMist's analysis, on July 26, the attacker directly called Circle's MessageTransmitterV2.sendMessage function on the Polygon chain, constructing a cross-chain message disguised as CCTP-style, claiming a transfer of 1 million USDC, despite no actual USDC burn operation occurring. Subsequently, Circle generated a valid attestation for this complete message following standard procedures.Approximately 24 days later, on August 19, the attacker waited for the Base Router to receive a genuine CCTP deposit, bringing its balance to approximately 191,000 USDC, then launched the attack just 6 seconds later. Using the previously forged message and attestation, the attacker called Allbridge's receiveCctpMessage function. Due to the project's lack of critical validation, the system mistook the fraudulent cross-chain message for a genuine deposit and recorded a 1 million USDC credit.Subsequently, the attacker borrowed approximately 809,000 USDC temporarily via an Aave flash loan to match the Router's balance with the forged amount, then utilized the internal credit record to call the transfer function, ultimately moving out approximately 999,000 USDC (after deducting a 0.1% fee). After repaying the flash loan and fees, the attacker netted approximately $189,800 in profit. The root cause of this vulnerability lies in Allbridge's failure to verify the identity of the cross-chain message sender and receiver, as well as its failure to confirm whether USDC was genuinely minted or whether the balance actually increased—instead directly trusting the amount and message hash data constructed by the attacker.SlowMist emphasized that on-chain message verification does not equate to actual asset arrival. Cross-chain protocols must not only verify message authenticity but also ensure the message source is trustworthy, confirm the receiver is Circle's official TokenMessengerV2, and only record assets after confirming actual minting and balance changes. This incident once again highlights the security risks in cross-chain bridges' message verification and asset settlement processes.
Odaily News: Metaverse gaming platform The Sandbox has confirmed a vulnerability in its cross-chain bridge, allowing attackers to mint unbacked SAND on Base and BNB Smart Chain. Blockchain security firm PeckShield detected on August 21 that two addresses had collectively minted approximately 14.9 billion SAND. The Sandbox subsequently shut down bridging functionality on both networks.The Sandbox stated that the affected assets are bridged assets on Base and BNB Smart Chain, while SAND on Ethereum and Polygon, user wallet assets, and the Ethereum-locked assets backing the token remain unaffected. The proportion of genuinely collateralized assets involved in this incident is less than 0.01% of the total SAND supply.The Sandbox is developing a compensation plan for affected liquidity providers and advises users not to trade SAND on Base or BNB Smart Chain until bridging is restored. Coinbase plans to delist 10 perpetual futures contracts, including SAND, on August 26, with open positions to be automatically settled at that time. (Bitcoin.com News)
The Sandbox has officially confirmed and fully secured the recent SAND cross-chain bridge vulnerability affecting the Base and BNB Smart Chain (BSC) networks. Attackers exploited the flaw to mint uncollateralized SAND tokens across both networks, but the impact remains limited, accounting for less than 0.01% of the total SAND supply. SAND on Ethereum and Polygon, along with user wallets, remain unaffected. The Sandbox has since disabled cross-chain functionality on both networks. SAND on Base and BSC has been isolated and is temporarily non-transferable and non-redeemable. The official team advises users to avoid buying, selling, or trading SAND on the aforementioned networks.
DeFi infrastructure company Enso disclosed a type of malicious liquidity pool called "toxic pools" in a report on July 16th. These pools manipulate transaction simulations to return false optimal quotes to wallets and DEX aggregators, subsequently altering the logic during actual on-chain execution. Enso stated that the relevant malicious contracts can identify read-only simulation environments and return optimized prices, but when the transaction is broadcast on-chain, it is executed at a worse price or causes the transaction to fail. One manipulated Curve pool processed over 129,000 swaps, resulting in approximately $225,000 in inflated quotes. Additionally, over 37,000 transactions were reverted, consuming nearly $30,000 in gas fees. On Polygon, a malicious Uniswap v4 hook attracted routing systems with fake exchange rates, subsequently triggering a 99.1% transaction failure rate. Enso stated that it has updated its execution protection product, Enso Shield, to detect fake quotes in Ethereum and Polygon environments.
Polymarket staff member Shantikiran Chanal posted on platform X, stating that they have taken note of the security reports related to reward distribution, and that user funds and market settlements remain safe. The investigation indicates that a private key leak occurred in a wallet used for internal operations, and the issue is not related to contracts or core infrastructure. Further updates will be provided.Previous report: ZachXBT stated that the Polymarket UMA CTF Adapter contract allegedly came under attack on Polygon, with over $520,000 having been drained.
According to on-chain investigator ZachXBT, Polymarket’s UMA CTF adapter on the Polygon network appears to have been attacked, resulting in losses exceeding $520,000 so far.
THORChain has released its fourth update regarding the Asgard vault intrusion incident, publishing the ADR028 proposal and opening voting for node operators. The proposal indicates that the protocol will first absorb losses through its Protocol-Owned Liquidity (POL), with the remaining portion to be borne by synthetic asset holders. The exact proportion is still under evaluation. The POL will be reduced to zero as a result, and the proposal suggests allocating a portion of system revenue over time to gradually replenish it. This plan does not involve minting new RUNE, selling RUNE, or diluting holder equity.On the technical side, the GG20 version will be temporarily retained with a patch upgrade. Trading will resume after the vulnerability is fixed and a successful node rotation is completed. A slower, more security-focused release cadence is planned for the future.Regarding the slashing mechanism, unrelated nodes sharing the same vault as the attacker will be protected, while the attacker's node will be fully slashed. The recovered RUNE will be paired with recoverable assets from the affected vault, and any excess RUNE will be burned.Additionally, THORChain has offered a white-hat bounty to the attacker to recover funds. If a portion of the funds is recovered, the recovery plan will be adjusted proportionally. THORChain emphasizes its commitment to remaining neutral and permissionless, stating it will not censor the attacker's swap transactions after trading resumes.Currently, node operators are voting on the overall direction and principles of the proposal. The specific figures in the ADR are indicative and will be adjusted later via the Mimir mechanism. The goal is to restart the network as soon as possible. A "yes" vote means developers can proceed further along this path.
Odaily Odaily, THORChain posted on platform X that its developers have released an incident update on Discord. Current evidence points to a node thor16uc...cn84q, which recently joined the network, as being associated with the attack. This node is operated by a single malicious actor. The primary hypothesis is that the attacker exploited a vulnerability in the GG20 TSS implementation, causing sensitive key material of vault participants to leak over time. This ultimately enabled the reconstruction of the vault's private key and the execution of unauthorized outgoing transactions.Regarding network status, the network has been paused after multiple node operators executed `make pause`. RUNE transfers and on-chain observation may resume within approximately 12 hours, but transactions, LP operations, signing, and other sensitive operations remain paused.Discussed recovery plans include slashing the affected node's bond, covering losses with protocol-owned liquidity (POL), or other community-driven solutions. THORSec and Outrider Analytics are continuing their investigation. The Treasury is gathering forensic data and coordinating with relevant law enforcement agencies. Full functional recovery is expected to take several days or longer.
Huma Finance posted on X platform, stating that its old v1 contract deployed on Polygon was exploited today, resulting in the transfer of approximately 101,400 USDC. This incident did not compromise user funds, and the related PST system was also unaffected. Only the gradually phased-out v1 legacy pools were impacted. The Huma v2 system is a complete rewrite deployed on Solana and is not vulnerable to this exploit. The team was already in the process of retiring v1 liquidity pools, and following this incident, they have fully suspended the operation of v1 contracts and accelerated the completion of migration efforts.
According to Blockaid’s monitoring, Ink Finance’s Workspace Treasury Proxy on Polygon was exploited minutes ago, involving approximately $140,000.
According to monetsupply.eth, Spark’s Strategy Lead, in a post on X, Spark has long maintained a relatively high borrowing interest rate cap for its SparkLend ETH market. Although this policy caused many users to migrate to Aave—resulting in substantial loss of business and revenue—the current market liquidity crisis has validated the prudence of this strategy. Presently, Aave is experiencing severe liquidity shortages across multiple chains—including Ethereum Mainnet, Arbitrum, Polygon Plasma, Mantle, and Base—with ETH borrowing utilization reaching 100%. This has prevented depositors from withdrawing funds and hindered normal liquidation of ETH collateral. He warns that if the current liquidity crunch persists, a 15–20% drop in ETH’s price could expose Aave to widespread bad debt—compounded by the potential impact of the rsETH vulnerability incident.
According to official news, the Polygon team has been actively monitoring the rsETH vulnerability: neither the Polygon Chain, Agglayer, nor the broader ecosystem including Katana and Vaultbridge have been affected by this incident.