News linked to both this project and an event.
According to on-chain analyst Ai Yi (@ai_9684xtpa), Four Meme has launched 4Stock, a new platform introducing the "crypto-equity + launchpad" concept. Its corresponding BSC meme token, $4Stock, has swiftly breached a $50M market cap. Of these, $BNC4 serves as the first stock brought on-chain via 4Stock, pegged to the US equity BNC (the BNB-version equivalent of MicroStrategy, tracking the ticker for publicly traded US firm CEA Industries supported by YZi Labs). In theory, it maintains a 1:1 peg with the underlying stock. However, driven by market speculation, BNC4's price briefly surged to $35, nearly eight times the after-hours price of the underlying equity. Arbitrageurs subsequently exploited the platform's Mint mechanism to redeem BNC4 for USDT, triggering massive profit-taking sales and causing the BNC4 price to immediately crash. User @ShawnThread redeemed 6,666 BNC4 for 231,000 USDT, becoming the first successful arbitrageur.
Odaily News According to GMGN data, the BSC meme token BNC4's market cap surged and then pulled back, briefly exceeding $20 million and currently standing at $2.8 million. Meanwhile, multiple users involved in arbitrage trading of the on-chain stock token BNC4 have disclosed profits ranging from tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands of dollars.Among them, trader 0xShawn stated that he completed arbitrage through Four.meme's BNC4 Mint mechanism, sharing a transaction record showing the exchange of 6,666 BNC4 for approximately 231,300 USDT. He noted that the related Mint request was processed normally and claimed to be among the first users to complete transfer invoicing.
Odaily News, SlowMist Security Team disclosed that the cross-chain bridge project Allbridge suffered an attack on August 19, 2026, with losses of approximately $190,000. Notably, this attack was not executed instantaneously—the attacker began laying the groundwork nearly a month in advance, bypassing the verification mechanism through forged cross-chain messages.According to SlowMist's analysis, on July 26, the attacker directly called Circle's MessageTransmitterV2.sendMessage function on the Polygon chain, constructing a cross-chain message disguised as CCTP-style, claiming a transfer of 1 million USDC, despite no actual USDC burn operation occurring. Subsequently, Circle generated a valid attestation for this complete message following standard procedures.Approximately 24 days later, on August 19, the attacker waited for the Base Router to receive a genuine CCTP deposit, bringing its balance to approximately 191,000 USDC, then launched the attack just 6 seconds later. Using the previously forged message and attestation, the attacker called Allbridge's receiveCctpMessage function. Due to the project's lack of critical validation, the system mistook the fraudulent cross-chain message for a genuine deposit and recorded a 1 million USDC credit.Subsequently, the attacker borrowed approximately 809,000 USDC temporarily via an Aave flash loan to match the Router's balance with the forged amount, then utilized the internal credit record to call the transfer function, ultimately moving out approximately 999,000 USDC (after deducting a 0.1% fee). After repaying the flash loan and fees, the attacker netted approximately $189,800 in profit. The root cause of this vulnerability lies in Allbridge's failure to verify the identity of the cross-chain message sender and receiver, as well as its failure to confirm whether USDC was genuinely minted or whether the balance actually increased—instead directly trusting the amount and message hash data constructed by the attacker.SlowMist emphasized that on-chain message verification does not equate to actual asset arrival. Cross-chain protocols must not only verify message authenticity but also ensure the message source is trustworthy, confirm the receiver is Circle's official TokenMessengerV2, and only record assets after confirming actual minting and balance changes. This incident once again highlights the security risks in cross-chain bridges' message verification and asset settlement processes.
According to crypto analyst Murphy, Bitget’s Phase 2 IPO Prime will be announced tonight at 18:00. On-chain data shows that preOPAI was minted on Solana by Republic on May 7, with the first batch of 29,082 tokens deposited into the project’s custodial account. The top-level instruction is `Mint_securities`, and the program invoked is `4X79YR...zMJwr3` (Republic’s access token issuance program). Only the final distribution step remains before its official launch on Bitget IPO Prime.
according to Arkham data, the null address (0x000...000) recently transferred a total of 99,900,000 BLESS, worth approximately $654,800, to a new address (0xa6a...1323) via minting.On-chain data shows that these tokens originated directly from the initial token mint. Currently, after receiving the tokens, this address frequently engages in small or batch sales on-chain.The current circulating supply of BLESS is 1.94B (1.94 billion tokens). The amount minted and transferred out this time accounts for approximately 5.15% of its total circulating supply. BLESS is currently trading at $0.006554, up 5.17% in the last 24 hours, with a fully diluted market cap of $12.72 million.