News linked to both this project and an event.
According to CryptoSlate, Microsoft and the cybersecurity organization Health-ISAC have obtained a U.S. court order to seize and redirect the domains supporting three services: YAM Store, CoGUI, and Iron Man. These three services sell stolen accounts and phishing tools to fraudsters. Since January this year, they have assisted in sending over 1 billion phishing messages, targeting more than 75,000 institutions across over 150 countries, generating tens of millions of dollars in revenue for operators. Microsoft has disabled more than 20,000 accounts associated with YAM Store and continues to block over 100,000 spoofing and fraudulent domains. According to Microsoft's investigation, these services accept payments in USDT (Tron network) and ETH, with Cloudflare noting that buyers can also pay using USDC. Blockchain analytics firm TRM Labs assisted investigators in locating and freezing related assets, though the frozen amount was not disclosed.
According to CryptoSlate, researchers from USENIX Security publicly disclosed a clock attack vulnerability against Solana’s Proof of History (PoH) mechanism on August 12. The vulnerability had been privately reported to the Solana development team as early as December 2025. Research indicates that a malicious scheduler leader could manipulate the PoH logical clock through "re-anchoring," slowing the progression of logical time. This would yield a longer transaction selection window within physical time, allowing the attacker to isolate honest leaders' blocks via the TowerBFT fork-choice mechanism, with the required stake for the attack falling below 33%. The Alpenglow security contest hosted by Anza, which offered a 50,000 SOL prize pool, concluded on August 19. However, the vulnerability was excluded from the evaluation scope because the contest rules explicitly excluded "behaviors that can only be triggered when Alpenglow is inactive." The Solana development team confirmed awareness of the issue, stating that the probability of the worst-case scenario occurring under current conditions is low. They expect the Alpenglow upgrade to fundamentally eliminate the attack's prerequisites. The Alpenglow code is already integrated into the Agave 4.2 client but remains inactive on the mainnet, with full deployment expected alongside Agave 4.3. Until then, the transitional risks associated with this vulnerability have yet to receive public implementation-level analysis or official responses.